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IN THE NAME OF ATHEISM.  
A CRITICAL RESPONSE TO PHILIPP 
BLOM'S BOOK ‘A WICKED COMPANY’ 
Elisabeth Van Dam 
In the introduction to his latest book A Wicked Company: The forgotten 
Radicalism of the European Enlightenment’ (2010), Philipp Blom 
promises to attract our attention to the contemporary relevance of a 
forgotten group of intellectual spirits, rehabilitating their historical 
reputation. This group was formed between 1750 and 1770, around the 
famous gatherings in the Parisian salon of Baron Thiry d’Holbach. 
According to Blom, the salon was host to the founding fathers of the 
movement of the radical Enlightenment and created the source of 
skeptical modern thinking, clearing the way to the scientific dispense 
with a theological approach to man and nature. From the start, Blom 
picks out his heroes and contrasts them to other  figures that somehow 
tend to be discredited along the story. Diderot, Holbach, Buffon, Grimm, 
Marmontel, Helvetius and the Encyclopédistes were the courageous: 
they were revolutionary and essential because they were the first 
atheists, living up to their materialism. Rousseau, Voltaire and even 
Hume (along with a large group of other British figures like Edward 
Gibbon, John Wilkes, Laurence Sterne, Adam Smith and David Garrick) 
were the conservatists, keeping either a pragmatic or sentimental 
opening towards religion and therefore bound to be week, repressive, 
128 E. VAN DAM 
 
restrained and emotional. Although the book presents itself as nuanced, 
reads lovely like a historic novel and is indeed very well documented, 
Blom nevertheless manages to surreptitiously smuggle his own 
(political) agenda into his account of a philosophical story he thinks 
unjustly to have fallen into oblivion. He does so by creating rather 
simple oppositions and divisions, reducing the merit of the 
Enlightenment to its radical offspring situated in Holbach’s coterie. All 
other efforts of enlightened philosophy, like those of the German, 
Kantian world, of Rousseau’s Bildungsideen or of the milder, pragmatic 
Brits, are cast into the corner of pseudo-theological solutions, keeping 
God at distance of their cold, rational or totalitarian systems but always 
within reach when temperatures get too low and danger is at hand. 
They were too weak for a wicked universe says Blom, that is, they could 
not live in a godless, meaningless universe discovered through 
knowledge of the laws of nature and in service of nothing else than our 
material needs, that is, of the hedonistic and unrestrained satisfaction 
of our lust in solidarity with the lust of others. Are these oppositions, as 
Blom presents them, really valuable or even right? There might  
perhaps be a reason for the fact that he dredges up a figure like Holbach 
from a past that witnesses of many other, interrelated thinkers he 
neglects, such as Kant or Lichtenberg, even though they too are 
discredited today but prove highly relevant to our present. Besides, 
they were more courageous and less conservative than Blom suggests.  
An important chapter in the book that reveals the heart of the 
problem for both Blom and the radical philosophes is the chapter on 
David Hume, le bon David as they used to call him in 18th century Paris. 
Holbach’s house was notorious throughout Europe because of the fame 
of the Encyclopédie as well as the attention Friedrich Grimm gave it in 
his journal Correspondance littéraire. When David Hume came to Paris 
as secretary of lord Hertford, the British ambassador in Paris, it was 
self-evident that he would announce his visit to Holbach’s salon. At that 
time he was a highly celebrated figure, not because of his philosophical 
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work but because of his bulky History of England (1754-1762), an 
honest, enlightened six-part account of England’s history and its violent 
past, admired because of its clarity and exemplary practice of the 
freedom of speech. His A Treatise on Human Nature (1739-1740) and the 
painstaking conclusions of his skeptical philosophy, produced when he 
was only 26, were not at all known at that time, presumably because few 
understood their radical implications. It was nevertheless the work he 
was admired for by Holbach’s friends, who were prepared to face these 
implications. This is the crucial point, because Hume in fact could not 
face them or better, he did not even wish it. His uncompromising 
philosophical gaze made any certainty about the world and God or even 
human personality vaporize. Nothing remained except stimuli, 
perception and psychology. His radical argument arrived at a point of 
nothingness, at an implacable deleting of all certainty, all belief and all 
trust in a higher truth. Hume cleared all thought for a confrontation 
with the void of a meaningless life. Blom compares Hume to Rousseau 
when he describes how the young philosophizing Scott fell terribly ill 
after he had written down his views and conclusions. He also stresses 
Hume’s despair when he found out that practically no one reacted on 
his revolutionary courage as he expected. Hume disgusted his own 
radical doubt and concluded to give up philosophy because he feared 
his own thoughts. He could not live without anything more than natural 
coincidence. From this angle Blom tries to show his reader that Hume is 
in fact very different and much less brave than the radical circle of 
Holbach. By contrasting Hume’s final, pragmatic choice for a softer 
attitude, that of agnosticism rather than atheism, with the political 
dimension of Diderot’s and Holbach’s anti-religious, “Lucretian” 
strength, Blom judges Hume to be week and inconsequent to his radical, 
philosophical position. But was Hume really inconsequent? His 
abandoning of his philosophical doubts was perhaps the bravest thing a 
philosopher could ever do, facing the impossible of life by nevertheless 
living it with love and with an interest in all of its aspects instead of 
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abstractly theorizing about its sterile conditions and forgetting to live 
it. Indeed, Blom overlooks some crucial elements at work in his 
fascinating account. 
Fear is the important concept in this problem. In this story – a 
history where we should not neglect the specific context determining 
specific reactions – fear has three different dimensions. Unfortunately 
Blom mixes them up. The first is the fear he ignores: the fear that has 
driven the radicals, as he describes and praises them, into the godless 
world of materialism. It is the fear for the empty space or blind spot in 
any system of (scientific) knowledge, that is, the void that anyone who 
is religious or has beliefs (be it in God or anything else that cannot be 
known, defined or understood) willingly embraces. It is a dimension of 
fear we actually should not fear but admit. Atheists are in fact most 
frightened of all, since they are scared of fear. They replace it by their 
belief in a religion of science. Nevertheless, they do not believe they too 
actually believe. A vast belief in the advance and certainty of science 
erases the blind, absurd, unfathomable, surprising, incalculable, 
indefinable, unsayable or obscure from human experience. It are these 
things Blom or any radicals in search for clarity and light cannot face, 
defending a world dictated by predictable laws. The poetry of an 
unpredictable God has no place in their positivist view. 
There is another dimension of fear Blom touches upon, one that has 
more right to be erased or replaced than the previous. This is the fear 
the church woke in its disciples, fear used as an instrument to attain 
power and oppression. Considered from Holbach’s historical context, 
defined by hierarchic domination and the patronizing of knowledge, it 
becomes clear why the church and all religious associations to 
instruments of power and fear like the ‘wrath of God’ or the ‘deadly 
sins’ had to be attacked in those days. It also makes clear why figures 
like Diderot defended such a radically political, atheist position towards 
the existence of a God, especially in the difficult climate of France. It 
nevertheless does not explain why keeping an opening towards 
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something beyond the facts of science and the material laws of nature 
should be considered as weak or sentimental, as Blom suggests. Because 
it should not. The tendency to ask for more than can be understood or 
predicted is very human and all attempts to create space for what 
cannot be subsumed under a natural law, in short, to create meaning in 
life, usually witness of the beauty of human creativity and of the power 
of imagination. Blom actually admits this in his account of Diderot’s 
letters and literary works, writings expressing inventiveness, drama 
and playfulness but also fear, regret and sadness for the loss of magic in 
life, for the problem morality poses and for the dead end Diderot’s 
radical, philosophical thoughts were leading to.  
This relates to a third aspect of fear: fear for the loss of meaning in a 
purely materialistic world, in an empty whirl of atoms and molecules. 
God or other ‘sentimental’ practices are meant to compensate for this 
loss. But Blom seems to be revolted by all attempts that allow for 
religious’ feelings’, in fact, for feelings and emotions tout court. This 
becomes most clear in his view on Rousseau. For Blom nothing 
Rousseau ever did was right, good or valuable. He blames Rousseau’s 
philosophy to be way too much biography, soaked in emotions and 
sentimental reactions against his enemy-friends. He makes the reader 
believe that all Rousseau ever wrote or created was the effect of his 
frustrations, of fear, jealousy, masochistic desires, misanthropy, 
pessimism, paranoia, megalomania and good PR. For Blom Rousseau 
equals secularized self-hatred, a soft form of Christian dogmatism that 
cannot free itself of the yoke of guilt. Rousseau’s originality and 
relevant contribution to the ‘colored shadows’ the Enlightenment had 
cast over Europe are therefore invalidated or even made ridiculous. The 
stressing of Rousseau’s unstable emotional nature creates a one-sided 
perspective on a figure who played an interesting part in the 
development of our cultural history. It is a reductionist perspective 
merely used to generate false oppositions and simple categories from 
where Blom convincingly writes his own program.  
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It is not surprising that materialist figures like Holbach and 
Helvetius are getting more and more into the picture of academic 
debates nowadays. Although Blom claims Holbach to be undeservedly 
neglected, he jumps on a hot topic for efficiency-minded practices 
nowadays. In my opinion, its impetus is partly related to how the 
dynamics between our instrumental, economic and scientifically 
oriented society and the developments of the academic culture, or 
better, academic business, creates interests and expectations. 
Universities format their research in line with financing systems that 
are built on highly profiled criteria of output and production, of speed, 
efficiency, ciphers and results instead of the indefinable values of 
education, development, human processes, creativity and pleasure. 
Although Blom’s epilogue fulminates against the rise of capitalism, 
liberalism and imperialism, resulting from the 19th century’s 
appropriation and abuse of the ‘soft form’ of the Enlightenment, he 
does not seem to admit how his praise of Holbach’s materialism merely 
conforms to the rule of contemporary liberal economic mechanisms 
built on a zealous belief in scientism at universities and in society. 
There is no much room left today for anything outside the economic 
criteria and scientifically calculable or definable standards dictating 
academic programs or the market, in short, there is no space for 
emotion, blind spots, surprise or even the poetry of an empty place like 
God. Everything has to be stuffed up with facts and figures, nothing is 
more interesting and fashionable than atoms, bits or the quantity of 
publications. Blom blames ‘soft philosophies’ like the one of Kant and 
German idealists or Rousseau and Voltaire of having created the 
opportunity to further oppression of our material body, in line with the 
tyranny of the church, that is, in line with a practice of guilt and hate 
towards our animal instincts and unreasonable impulses. Blom argues 
that this is due to their dehumanizing rationalism that makes human 
desires – Diderot’s hedonist love for volupté – secondary to an all-
overruling system preceded by capitalist symbols of power like Reason 
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or Will. In my view, this is not a correct conclusion. First of all, Blom 
simplifies the complexity of the philosophies of Kant and others. He 
definitely misinterpreted Kant’s structural vision of the place of God in 
his moral philosophy and his dynamic idea of the organ of Reason, 
which is not an instrument of power but a moving force in 
correspondence with the movements of man. He creates too many 
inconsistencies between the parties he wishes to be opponents. The 
different figures of the Enlightenment had indeed very different views 
but they were no enemies towards each other, on the contrary, the 
worst villains of this story seem to be the censors of the church and 
state, whose disapproving presence looms menacingly over the 
proceedings of all figures. Secondly, Blom forgets that Holbach’s 
materialism in fact creates much more space for a dehumanization of 
our world and being than Kant or Rousseau ever did since it explicitly 
erases the natural, human tendency to feel guilty, to create meaning, to 
allow Gods and magic or avoid the direct satisfaction of desire and lust 
by restricting and restraining the drives of our body. Blom claims 
Diderot and co in their hedonist motto to ‘live now’ to be the direct 
forbears of Freud’s destruction of illusions on human drives. He 
obviously did not learn from Vienna’s hysterics, since it was Freud who 
discovered and described how all humans create mechanisms and 
symptoms that help dealing with the immediacy of their lust, that is, 
with the danger of their submission to unrestricted pleasure. Human 
beings cannot live like unregulated machines, be it lust-machines, 
production-machines or fact-machines. In fact, people do not seek for 
unfettered lust but merely try to avoid pain. Indeed, they even prove to 
have lust in pain. People need guilt and punishment. History shows that 
the unnatural tendency of human natures to always find a way outside 
of themselves, to create places, points and positions beyond themselves, 
opening a space to move in relation to themselves as a judge, a third, a 
God or restrictor, is absolutely natural and even sane. I don’t think 
Diderot or Holbach even would deny this, although Blom suggests they 
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desire human beings that live inhuman, that is, as pure lust-seekers. 
Some of the few citations and fragments from letters and works of the 
philosophes Blom quotes, cast a more nuanced light on their beliefs. I 
wish Blom had done this much more because it certainly would uncover 
his too simple story of the good versus the bad. While the book is well 
researched, it is lightly footnoted and Blom is often content to tell us 
what his subjects thought, rather than let them speak in their own 
words. A serious dialogue with the past should not be as monotone as 
this. Nevertheless, while Holbach and Diderot are the clear heroes of 
this book, they are not portrayed without their flaws.  
Blom’s book is not entirely without merit. With great enthusiasm 
and literary panache he opens and defends a part of the past that could 
be inspiring for our intellectual future. Not particularly the atheist-
beliefs Blom thinks valuable for us, but much rather the 
interdisciplinary and artful spirit of the salon with its open culture to 
education and elevation by debate, is in my opinion a powerful 
instrument we could use today. Blom describes and praises how 
Holbach’s house welcomed a broad range of very differently educated 
figures from all over Europe with many different talents and interests, 
debating all together in a vivid, equal, nonchalant and aesthetic 
atmosphere. Sharing thoughts with each other without being motivated 
by profit or professional reasons but out of passion for the beauty and 
constructive effects of it, seems a forgotten activity today. We could 
learn from the hybris of a salon like Holbach’s, and try breaking free 
from academic conventions or hierarchic structures and oppositions 
between different scientific branches, departments, specializations and 
disciplines that lock us up in single-minded worlds. The cross-
pollination between art, literature, science, philosophy and life is most 
fertile for those trying to practice the art of life. Blom shows us what a 
fascinating age the 18th century was and what courageous people 
preceded us while battling for the freedom we have today, practicing 
their hybrid life in surrender and in exchange with other brave spirits. 
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Blom has successfully made his case for a reappraisal of the radicals of 
Paris. Nevertheless, his hinted prejudice betrays his political position 
and favor for the contemporary success of evolutionary materialism, 
scientism and skeptical thinking. It is a pity that his spirited story of the 
French stars of the Enlightenment is cast in the shadow of an implicit 
program that in fact conforms to capitalist structures instead of 
breaking with them. ‘Live now’, the motto he pushes into Diderot, could 
easily be seen today as ‘buy now’: satisfy your needs immediately on the 
market. However, as history learns, all books that conform to 
contemporary tendencies in society and at universities, catching the 
light of ‘likes’ and success, are usually running behind. What is to come 
is still slumbering but already preparing in the shadows. 
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